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Abstract
Our paper presents an examination of how preferences for rearing children affect
fertility and income growth. As described in reports of the related literature, an
aging society with an increase in life expectancy reduces fertility because the pref-
erence for children decreases relatively. However, in the model with the endogenous
child care service price, a decrease in preference for children does not always reduce
fertility because a decrease in the price of child care service raises fertility. Then,
income growth can not decrease because fertility does not always increase. The
subsidy for child care service increases both the share of using child care service and
the labor share of the child care service sector. Then, the wage rate of the child care
service sector rises, too.
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1 Introduction
Our paper presents an examination of how preferences for rearing children affects fertility
in the endogenous child care service price. The preference for rearing children is related
to life expectancy. An increase in life expectancy reduces the preference for rearing
children. Thereby, fertility decreases. This result was derived by Yakita (2001), van
Groezen, Leers, and Meijdam (2008) and others as reported in the related literature.
However, the relative decrease in the preference for rearing children with an increase in
life expectancy raises the preference for consumption in the old period. Consequently,
the saving rate increases. Then, the capital accumulation is facilitated. The capital
stock per capita increases because of increased savings and decreased fertility.
The aim of these analyses is to examine how fertility is determined in an endogenous
fertility model with a child care service sector. Our paper sets a two-sector model, with
a final goods sector and a child care service sector, based on Yasuoka (2019).1 With
an endogenous price of child care services, our manuscript derives the result that an
increased preference for children can not always raise fertility. Therefore, a decrease
in the preference for rearing children as an increase in life expectancy can not always
reduce fertility. This result differs from those in reports of the related literature in that
a decrease in the preference for rearing children by an increase in life expectancy reduces
the fertility.
Moreover, we verify the effects of a child care service subsidy on fertility. Because of
the subsidy, both the share of using child care services and the labor share of the child
care service sector increases. Then, the wage rate of the child care service sector rises.
This result shows positive correlation between fertility and labor force participation.
This result is consistent with data provided by Sleebos (2003).
Apps and Rees (2004) and Ferrero and Iza (2004) consider child care services and
parental child care time. Thereby, they derive correlation between the fertility and
female labor participation. These analyses derive a positive correlation. If one considers
1Yasuoka (2019) sets a two-sector model: a final goods sector and an elderly care service sector.
However, Yasuoka (2019) considers a small open economy without consideration of capital accumulation.
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only parental child care, then negative correlation is obtainable, as shown by Galor
and Weil (1996). By virtue of capital accumulation, the demand for child care services
increases and the child care time decreases. These earlier reports describe that fertility
is positively correlated with female labor force participation. Different from the results
obtained from these reports of the literature, we derive how the subsidy for child care
service affects the share of using child care services and the labor share of the child care
service sector.
Van Groezen, Leers, and Meijdam (2003) show that the child allowance, as a subsidy
for child care, raises fertility. However, if one considers capital accumulation, then
the child allowance reduces fertility, as explained by Fanti and Gori (2009), because a
decrease in capital accumulation reduces the wage income. Yasuoka and Miyake (2010)
present the negative effect of subsidy policy on fertility because of an increase in child
care services.
The remaining parts of paper are arranged to present our examination and the salient
conclusions. Section 2 sets the model. Section 3 derives the equilibrium and presents
an examination of how the preference for children affects fertility. Section 4 examines
effects of a subsidy for child care service on fertility and income growth. The final section
concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Individuals in households live in two periods: young and old. During the young period,
the children work to obtain income. They consume goods in the old period. We assume
the following log utility function:
ut = α lnnt + (1− α) ln ct+1, 0 < α < 1. (1)
In that equation, nt and ct+1 denote fertility (number of children) and consumption in
the old period. In this model, child care of two types exists: self child care, representing
parental time spent, and purchased child care services provided through the child care
service market. If the individuals use the child care service, then the lifetime budget
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constraint is shown as
w¯t = ztnt +
ct+1
1 + rt+1
. (2)
In that equation, w¯t represents the wage income, zt denotes the price of child care
services, and rt+1 denotes the interest rate. Therefore, the parents use the child care
services; they can provide a full time supply of labor.
If the individuals care for the children by themselves, then the budget constraint is
(1− φnt)w¯t = ct+1
1 + rt+1
, 0 < φ < 1. (3)
In that equation, φ is needed for the care time for a child. Because of the child care time
φnt, the parents supply labor time of 1− φnt.
There exist firms of two types in this model economy: one produces final goods; the
other firm produces child care services. The production function in the firm of the final
goods is assumed as
Yt = K
θ
t (BtLt)
1−θ, 0 < θ < 1. (4)
The output of final goods Yt is produced by inputting the capital stock Kt and the
effective labor Lt. Bt = b
Kt
Lt
, (b > 0) shows the Romer (1986) and Grossman and
Yanagawa (1993) type of externality. With competitive market, the effective wage rate
wt and the interest rate 1 + rt are given by the follows,
wt = (1− θ)b1−θKt
Lt
, (5)
1 + rt = θb
1−θ. (6)
The profit function pit in the child care service is assumed as
pit = ztρL
c
t − wctLct , 0 < ρ. (7)
Therein, Lct represents the labor input to child care services. Also, w
c
t denotes the wage
rate in child care services. With a competitive market, the wage rate in the child care
service sector is shown as presented below:
zt =
wct
ρ
. (8)
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As described in this paper, we assume that individuals have ability a. This ability
a is assumed to differ among individuals; it is distributed in [0, a¯]. This ability a shows
labor productivity in production of the final goods. If individuals work in the final
goods market, they can obtain w¯t = awt. If they work in the child care market, they
can obtain w¯t = w
c
t , irrespective of a. This setting is based on the explanation presented
by Meckl and Zink (2004).2 Therefore, with high a, they work in the final goods sector.
Otherwise, they work in the child care service sector.3 The cut off ability a˜ is given as
a˜ =
wct
wt
. (9)
Then, the labor shares of child care service sector and the final goods sector are shown
respectively by a˜a¯ and
a¯−a˜
a¯ .
If the workers in the final goods sector use child care services, their fertility is shown
as 4
nt =
αawt
zt
. (10)
If care time for children is given without child care service, then the fertility can be
presented as 5
nt =
αawt
φawt
=
α
φ
. (11)
We define the ability a to hold αawtzt =
α
φ as aˆ. aˆ shows indifference between child care
by the market service and that by one’s own time. If individuals have ability a > aˆ,
they use the child care service. Otherwise, they care for children with their own time.
Therefore, the share of a¯−aˆa¯ uses the child care service. Because of these equations aˆ, a˜,
the following equation can be obtained:
aˆ =
a˜
φρ
. (12)
2Meckl and Zink (2004) considers labor of two types: skilled and unskilled. Skilled laborers obtain
a2wt. By contrast, unskilled laborers obtain awt. Substantially, this setting is the same as that used for
the analyses presented herein.
3Productivity a shows no absolute ability of labor but a relative ability. Low a shows insufficient skill
in the final goods sector, but high skill in the child goods sector.
4We can obtain fertility to maximize utility (1) subject to (2).
5We can obtain fertility to maximize utility (1) subject to (3). The fertility of child care service
workers can be given as (11).
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We assume φρ < 1 for simplicity. Then, we can obtain aˆ > a˜. Therefore, individuals
with ability [0, a˜] work in the child care service sector and care for their children using
their own time. Individuals who have ability [a˜, aˆ] work in the final goods sector and
care for their children using their own time. Individuals who have ability [aˆ, a¯] work in
the final goods sector and use the child care services for their children.
3 Equilibrium
This section presents derivation of the equilibrium of the model economy in this paper.
The equilibrium can be given by the child care service market and the capital market.
First, we consider the child care market equilibrium. Demand for child care service is
given as
∫ a¯
aˆ
αawt
zt
1
a¯da. The supply for child care services is given as (9). Then, because
of these two equations, the following equation can be shown as the child care service
market equilibrium condition:
α(a¯2 − aˆ2)
2φaˆ
= ρa˜. (13)
With (12) and (13), we can obtain aˆ and a˜ as
aˆ = a¯
√
α
2φ2ρ2 + α
, (14)
a˜ = φρa¯
√
α
2φ2ρ2 + α
. (15)
After obtaining daˆdα > 0,
daˆ
dφ < 0,
daˆ
dρ < 0 and
da˜
dα > 0,
da˜
dφ > 0,
da˜
dρ > 0, one can consider
a decrease in the preference for children α as representing the case of an aging society
with fewer children. A decrease in α decreases aˆ: the share of using child care services
increases because the number of children at each household decreases.
The average number of children or fertility na is given as
na =
∫ a¯
aˆ
αawt
zt
1
a¯
da+
∫ aˆ
0
α
φ
1
a¯
da
=
α(a¯2 + aˆ2)
2φa¯aˆ
. (16)
The sign of dn
a
dα is ambiguous because
dna
dα
=
na
α
−
α
(
a¯2
aˆ2
− 1
)
2φa¯
daˆ
dα
. (17)
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The sign of dn
a
dα is determined depending on the level of n
a. Large na brings about
dna
dα > 0. However, with small n
a, we can obtaindn
a
dα < 0: even if the preference for
children increases, the fertility can not always increase because of the child care service
market. As shown by (10) and (11), an increase in α raises fertility. However, with an
increase in the demand for child care service, the price of child care service rises, which
reduces the demand for child care service. Then, this reduces the fertility. The former
positive effect and the latter negative effect on fertility co-exist. Therefore, the effect on
fertility is ambiguous. The following proposition can be established.
Proposition 1 An increase in the preference for children α can not always raise fertility.
An increase in the preference for children α raises aˆ.
If we consider the model economy without child care service or a one-sector model,
then the fertility can always be raised by virtue of an increase in α. However, by
considering child care services as a two-sector model, an increase in α does not always
raise fertility.
Next, we examine the effects of a preference for children α on income growth. Defining
kt =
Kt
Nt
(Nt denotes the population size of younger people) as the capital stock per capita
and Lt =
(
a¯−aˆ
a¯ +
(aˆ−a˜)(1−φn)
a¯
)
Nt as effective labor, the capital market equilibrium is
given as 6
Kt+1 = Nt(1− α)
(∫ a¯
a˜
awt
1
a¯
da+
∫ a˜
0
wct
1
a¯
da
)
=
1− α
a¯
a¯2 + a˜2
2
wt. (18)
Then, the income growth rate 1 + g ≡ kt+1kt is given as
kt+1
kt
=
(1− α)(1− θ)b1−θ(a¯2 + ρ2φ2aˆ2)
2na(a¯− (1− (1− ρφ)(1− α))aˆ) . (19)
As shown by (19), an increase in the preference for children α reduces the income growth
rate directly because saving for consumption in the old period decreases. However, an
6Lt denotes the labor input for final goods sector. Therefore, workers of the child care service sector
are not included.
7
increase in α raises aˆ. This effect raises the income growth rate. Moreover, an increase in
α reduces Lt, which positively affects income growth. If the average fertility n
a increases,
then this effect on the income growth rate is negative because of the dilutive effect on the
capital stock. Therefore, the increase in effects on income growth is ambiguous because
these effects on income growth exist. Then, the following proposition can be established.
Proposition 2 An increase in α can not reduce income growth rate because of ambiguous
effects on average fertility and positive effects on aˆ.
As shown by reports of the related literature, an increase in life expectancy, which
entails a decrease in the preference for children, raises the income growth rate because
saving increases and fertility decreases. However, if we regard the price of child care
service as a two-sector model, the income growth rate can not always increase because
fertility can decrease and aˆ increases. An increase in aˆ increases a˜, as shown by (12). The
wage income of the child care service workers increases and saving increases. Therefore,
these counter-effects exist. The effect of an increase in preference for children on income
growth is ambiguous.
4 Subsidy for Child Care Services
This section presents examination of the effects of a subsidy for child care services on
fertility. Defining  and τ respectively as the subsidy rate of child care service and the
income tax rate, household budget constraints (2) and (3) are changed as shown below:
(1− τ)w¯t = (1− )ztnt + ct+1
1 + rt+1
, (20)
(1− φnt)(1− τ)w¯t = ct+1
1 + rt+1
. (21)
The government budget constraint is given as

∫ a¯
aˆ
ztnt
1
a¯
da = τ
(∫ a¯
aˆ
awt
1
a¯
da+
∫ aˆ
a˜
(1− φn)awt 1
a¯
da+
∫ a˜
0
(1− φn)wct
1
a¯
da
)
. (22)
8
In this case, a˜ are given as (9). Also, aˆ is shown as
aˆ =
(1− )a˜
(1− τ)φρ. (23)
By total differentiation of (22) and (23) with respect to , τ , aˆ, and a˜ at the approx-
imation of  = 0 and τ = 0, one can obtain the following equation:
d =
a¯2 − αaˆ2 + (1− α)a˜2
α(a¯2 − aˆ2) dτ, (24)
daˆ = aˆdτ − a˜
φρ
d+
1
φρ
da˜. (25)
The child care service market equilibrium (13) is modified as the following form in the
case of a subsidy:
αwt(1− τ)
(1− )zt
a¯2 − aˆ2
2
= ρa˜. (26)
Considering (1−τ)wt(1−)zt =
1
aˆφ and total differentiation of this equation with respect to aˆ, a˜,
we can obtain
daˆ = − ρφaˆ
αaˆ+ ρφa˜
da˜. (27)
With (24), (25) and (27), we can obtain daˆdτ as shown below:
daˆ
dτ
=
aˆ− a˜(a¯2−αaˆ2+(1−α)a˜2)
ρφα(a¯2−aˆ2)
1 + αaˆ+ρφa˜
ρ2φ2aˆ
. (28)
If the numerator is positive, i.e., if the decrease effect of subsidy on aˆ is large, daˆdτ is
negative. The share of individuals who use the child care service increases. The first
term in the numerator shows the taxation effect. Taxation reduces demand for child
care services; aˆ increases. The second term represents the subsidy effect. The subsidy
raises the demand for child care services and aˆ decreases. If the subsidy effect is greater
than the taxation effect, one can obtain daˆdτ < 0. From (27), the labor share of the child
care services market increases.
In the case of subsidy, the average fertility (16) is modified to the following form:
na =
∫ a¯
aˆ
α(1− τ)awt
(1− )zt
1
a¯
da+
∫ aˆ
0
α
φ
1
a¯
da =
ρφa˜+ αaˆ
φa¯
. (29)
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Here, dn
a
dτ can be presented as shown below:
dna
dτ
= −ρa˜
a¯aˆ
daˆ
dτ
. (30)
With daˆdτ < 0, average fertility increases. Then, the following proposition can be estab-
lished.
Proposition 3 A subsidy for child care services can raise the share of the individuals
who use child care services. If aˆ decreases because of an increase in the share of using
child care service, then the average fertility can increase.
The subsidy facilitates the use of child care services. An increase in α has a direct
positive effect on fertility. However, the subsidy reduces aˆ, which differs from the result
of an increase in α by which aˆ rises. A decrease in aˆ shows an increase in a˜. An increase
in a˜ shows the share of working in the child care service sector. The wage rate of the
child care sector increases, as shown by (9) and (27).
5 Conclusions
Our paper presents an examination of how the preference for children affects fertility
and income growth. Because of endogenous child care service pricing, an increase in
preference for children can not always raise the fertility caused by an increase in the
price of child care service. This result demonstrates that even if the preference for
children decreases, fertility does not always decrease. This result can not be derived
in the related reports of the literature that an increase in life expectancy invariably
reduces fertility. Therefore, income growth can not always decrease by an increase in
the preference for children because fertility can not always increase. The dilutive effect
on the capital stock does not occur.
Moreover, the subsidy for child care service increases the share of people using child
care services. By virtue of the subsidy policy, the fertility increases. The share of using
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the child care service sector increases. This result brings about an increase in the labor
force participation rate.
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